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Them 
P
ipelines to the north. Walls to the south. Between 
President Trump’s issuance of a permit for the Keystone 
XL pipeline crossing from Canada and his promise to 
build “The Wall,” the politics of our national borders 
rarely have been in as much turmoil as they are today. And as 
with any infrastructure project, environmental policy has been 
deeply in play all the way. But the environmental law of the 
borders might surprise you. Indeed, arguably there isn’t any for 
these two projects.
Let’s start at the top. Reversing the Obama administra-
tion’s position, in March 2017 the State Department issued 
a permit to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., authoriz-
ing TransCanada to construct, connect, operate, and maintain 
pipeline facilities at the U.S.–Canadian border in Phillips  
County, Montana, to import crude oil. See U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Presidential Permit (Mar. 24, 2017), available at https:// 
keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
269322.pdf. All indications were that the Obama administra-
tion originally was moving in that direction as well, issuing 
a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS) in 2011 declaring the project 
environmentally on par with alternatives. See U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Key-
stone XL Project (Aug. 26, 2011). However, although over 
a dozen major pipelines cross the border with Canada—and 
over 100 major oil, natural gas, and electric transmission 
lines cross our northern and southern borders—the Key-
stone XL pipeline took on a symbolic, if not toxic, proile, 
and the Obama administration slowed down its process. The 
State Department eventually issued a supplemental EIS in 
January 2014 to update its environmental assessment and 
tee up a inal permit decision. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Final 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Keystone XL Project (Jan. 2014) (2014 XL FSEIS). Environ-
mental interest group objections, centered around climate 
change impacts, grew even louder in volume. Ultimately, 
President Obama announced his agreement with Secretary 
of State John Kerry’s decision to deny the permit. See U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Keystone XL Pipeline Determination (Nov. 
6, 2015), available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2015/11/249249.htm.
When the Trump administration so quickly into its ten-
ure reversed that decision, environmental interest groups 
cried foul and immediately brought suit. See Indigenous Envtl. 
Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:17-cv-00029-BMM (D. 
Mont., complaint iled Mar. 27, 2017); Northern Plains Res. 
Council v. Shannon, No. 4:17-cv-00031-BMM (D. Mont., com-
plaint iled Mar. 30, 2017). Like any typical infrastructure 
project permit embroiled in such controversy, NEPA and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) play leading roles in the law-
suits, especially given that the Trump administration prepared 
no new or supplemental EIS or ESA determinations. But this 
is not your typical infrastructure project permit.
To begin with, the State Department issued a presidential 
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permit. Presidents long have taken the position that their 
authority over foreign relations empowers them to permit 
or deny border-crossing infrastructure. A complex web of 
executive orders and agency rules and guidance governs the 
presidential permit process, with two executive orders being 
of central importance to oil pipelines. President Johnson in 
1968 issued Executive Order 11423 to designate the Depart-
ment of State as the agency administering the presidential 
permits program for speciied facilities including oil pipelines. 
33 Fed. Reg. 11,741 (Aug 16, 1968). Executive Order 11423 
references no speciic constitutional or statutory authority, 
asserting instead that “proper conduct of the foreign relations 
of the United States requires that executive permission be 
obtained for the construction and maintenance at the borders 
of the United States of facilities connecting the United States 
with a foreign country.” Id. In 2004, President George W. 
Bush amended Executive Order 11423 with Executive Order 
13337, which requires the State Department to issue a presi-
dential permit “if the Secretary of State inds that issuance 
of a permit to the applicant would serve the national inter-
est.” 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299, 25,300 (Apr. 30, 2004). Notably, a 
different set of executive orders covers natural gas pipelines 
and electric transmission lines, designating other agencies as 
the permit administrators, and federal legislation also governs 
those facilities, whereas no federal statute has been enacted 
governing oil pipeline siting, much less pipeline border cross-
ings. See generally Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Permits for 
Border Crossing Energy Facilities, CRS R43261 (Oct. 29, 
2013).
On their face, executive orders for oil pipelines describe 
what looks like a routine infrastructure permitting process, 
complete with interagency coordination. Indeed, although 
the executive orders do not mention NEPA or the ESA, the 
State Department conducts what it describes as a “NEPA con-
sistent review” of permit applications, which includes review 
“consistent with” the ESA and the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act (NHPA). See 2014 XL FSEIS, at 7; see also U.S. Dep’t 
State, Environmental Reviews for Presidential Permitting, https://
www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/reviews/index.htm. By “consistent 
with,” however, the State Department means not required by.
The reality of presidential permits for oil pipelines is 
that they are presidential permits. The president issues them 
through the State Department, but Executive Order 13337 
explicitly provides that the president retains the authority to 
issue a inal decision on whether or not to issue the presiden-
tial permit. 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299, 25,300. There is sparse case 
law on the legal implications of this structure. One court has 
held that nothing about the State Department’s role in the 
presidential permit process changes the presidential charac-
ter of the action, thus insulating State Department’s actions 
from the requirements of NEPA, the ESA, and the NHPA. 
See Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. 
Supp. 2d 1071, 1081 (D.S.D. 2009). By contrast, another 
court held that, while the president’s exercise of permitting 
power is constitutional, the executive order’s delegation of 
the permitting evaluation function to the State Department 
subjects the agency to judicial review of its NEPA compli-
ance. See Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157 
(D. Minn. 2010). Under that reasoning, it is not clear what 
would happen if a court deems the State Department’s EIS 
deicient under NEPA but the president nonetheless issues 
a border crossing permit under the retained “inal decision” 
authority. Also, presumably the president could nullify the 
effect of the court’s decision by withdrawing delegation of the 
State Department’s permitting functions for any particular 
permit.
The lawsuits challenging President Trump’s permit reassert 
the claim that the presidential permit is unconstitutional and, 
if not, that the State Department’s actions are subject to the 
ESA, NEPA, and other environmental statutes. Yet, while doz-
ens of other federal and state environmental programs could 
apply to the pipeline after it crosses the border, the law as it 
stands now is that there may be no environmental law of oil 
pipeline border crossings.
Looking to the south, one inds an equally convoluted legal 
story leading to the prospect of no environmental law govern-
ing President Trump’s proposed border wall. The irst step in 
that direction came when Congress in 1996 directed the U.S. 
attorney general to “install additional physical barriers and 
roads . . . in the vicinity of the United States border to deter 
illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United 
States.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. 
I, § 102, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–554 (codiied as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1103 note). IIRIRA authorized the attorney general 
to waive the provisions of the ESA and NEPA to the extent 
“necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers 
and roads” at the border. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. Notwithstand-
ing that construction of improvements to the initial stretch of 
border fence in San Diego had slowed because of conlict with 
the California Coastal Commission, the attorney general opted 
to have the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection comply 
with NEPA and the ESA.
With the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and consolidation of various authorities into its 
jurisdiction in response to growing concern about border 
security, Congress in 2005 amended Section 102 of IIRIRA 
to grant to the Secretary of Homeland Security author-
ity to waive “all legal requirements such Secretary, in such 
Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure 
expeditious construction of the barriers and roads.” REAL 
ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 102, 119 
Stat. 231, 306 (emphasis added). Note the “all” preceding 
“legal requirements”—Congress plainly intended the REAL 
ID Act waiver to extend far beyond the ESA and NEPA, to 
authorize waiver of any federal, state, or local legislation. See 
H. Rep. 109-72 at 171 (2005). The provision also precludes 
all judicial review of a waiver except for claims alleging a 
constitutional violation. REAL ID Act § 102(c)(2). Appeals 
from a district court’s resolution of such constitutional chal-
lenges are limited to certiorari review by the Supreme Court. 
Id. § 102(c)(2)(A).
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff irst exer-
cised the REAL ID Act’s broad waiver authority when 
environmental interest groups sued to stop the San Diego por-
tion of the fence by challenging the agency’s NEPA EIS and 
ESA determinations. See 70 Fed. Reg. 55,622 (Sept. 22, 2005); 
72 Fed. Reg. 2535 (Jan. 19, 2007). After the waiver, the court 
rejected arguments that the waiver provision is an unconsti-
tutional delegation of authority to the president because it 
lacks “intelligible principles” to guide the agency’s decision. 
Save Our Heritage Organization v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58 
(D.D.C. 2008). The environmental groups did not appeal the 
decision.
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U
nder the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Air 
Act, and other environmental statutes, when and on 
what issues is a plaintiff—or defendant—entitled to 
a jury trial? However straightforward this question 
might sound, it triggers a range of challenging constitutional 
construction and statutory interpretation issues, often so 
blurred that parties simply agree to a bench trial.
As for the constitutional requirements, the Seventh 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “in Suits 
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”  
With respect to environmental cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412 (1987), is the 
touchstone opinion applying the right to trial by jury articu-
lated by the Seventh Amendment to the CWA and other 
environmental statutes.
In a decision by Justice William Brennan, the Tull Court 
examined whether a party—in this case, the defendant—had a 
right to a jury trial on both liability and penalties in an action 
under the CWA. As for the facts, a landowner placed fill 
mate-rial at various locations but contended the fill had not 
been placed in jurisdictional “wetlands.” Although the U.S. 
Depart-ment of Justice conceded there were triable issues of 
fact on whether such areas were jurisdictional wetlands, the 
trial court denied the defendant’s request for a jury trial.
In Tull, the Supreme Court—after first determining that the 
CWA did not itself provide a jury trial right—concluded the 
Seventh Amendment provided a jury trial right for “those 
actions that are analogous to ‘Suits at Common law.’” 481 
U.S. at 417. Working from this premise, the Court developed 
a two-part test to make this determination. First, in evaluat-
ing whether a right to jury trial is required, the statutory action 
must be compared to 18th-century actions brought in the 
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and 
equity. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to 
those statutory rights that are analogous to common law causes 
of actions decided by English law courts. Second, the remedy 
sought must be examined to determine whether it is legal or 
equitable in nature, because only legal actions are entitled to a 
jury trial. After a lengthy historical analysis of English and 
Colonial common law actions, the Supreme Court held that a 
right to a jury trial exists to determine liability under the 
CWA, but not the amount of penalties or other remedies, if 
any, which are determined by the court.
In Tull, although the United States was the plaintiff oppos-
ing a jury trial, the identity of a plaintiff does not change the 
jury trial analysis. In a North Carolina case, the trial court 
explained that as far as the right to a jury trial is concerned, 
private plaintiffs seeking civil penalties in a citizens’ suit are 
no different from the government itself so asserting in a law-
suit. N.C. Envtl. Justice Network v. Taylor, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 177773, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2014). At the same 
Secretary Chertoff invoked the power again in 2007 to 
waive a long list of federal, state, and local laws to facili-
tate construction of fencing along the Arizona border. See 
72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007). Environmental interest 
groups had challenged the Arizona fence project on a variety 
of grounds, and the federal district court issued a temporary 
restraining order. The secretary responded with the waiver. 
The court quickly vacated the temporary restraining order and 
dismissed claims that Section 102’s grant of waiver authority 
violated separation of powers and other constitutional bounds. 
The court ruled that the waiver provision is not equivalent 
to the power to amend or repeal duly enacted laws, that it 
is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to 
the executive branch given the suficient statutory principle 
that the waiver be “necessary to ensure expeditious construc-
tion of the barriers and roads,” and that the construction of 
the border fence pertains to both foreign affairs and immigra-
tion control—areas over which the president traditionally 
exercises independent constitutional authority. See Defend-
ers of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007). 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment. Sec-
retary Chertoff used the waiver again in 2008 for a 450-mile 
stretch spanning all four border states. See 73 Fed. Reg. 18,294 
(Apr. 3, 2008). A lawsuit challenging this massive waiver was 
dismissed on grounds similar to the Defenders of Wildlife deci-
sion, with no appeal taken. See Cnty. of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. 
EP-08-CA-196 FM, 2008 WL 4372693 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 
2008).
The REAL ID Act waiver authority has not been used 
again since 2008, but neither has the REAL ID Act waiver 
provision been touched. The upshot is that while all environ-
mental laws could apply to President Trump’s proposed wall 
along our border with Mexico, his administration appears 
likely to exercise the waiver power to assert that there is no 
environmental law of the wall.
Energy security and border security are important public 
policy goals, and it is understandable that the president and 
Congress would wish that no unreasonable obstacles stand in 
the way of achieving them. At a time when the growing con-
centration of power in the executive has raised substantial 
concern, however, the presidential permit and the REAL ID 
Act waiver are likely to attract continuing scrutiny and con-
troversy for how much discretion they give the president over 
deeming what is and is not an unreasonable obstacle. Ironi-
cally, whereas many members of Congress are among the most 
vocal critics of growing executive branch power, Congress has 
done nothing to check the presidential permit program for 
oil pipelines and actually created the apparently unbounded 
waiver power of the REAL ID Act. Opponents of both regimes 
have thus far made little headway, albeit with only in a hand-
ful of district court opinions and one denial of certiorari on the 
books. With litigation already ensuing over the Keystone XL 
permit, and any exercise of waiver for more border wall likely 
to attract a lawsuit in an instant, it looks like the courts are 
not inished yet.  
Mr. Ruhl is the David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law at 
Vanderbilt University Law School in Nashville, Tennessee, and a member 
of the editorial board of Natural Resources & Environment. He may be 
reached at jb.ruhl@vanderbilt.edu.
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